What went wrong?

The fact that he has ended up in No.10 helps avoid too many media questions about the failure of the Tory campaign but that is exactly what it was.  An open goal was missed with the impact of the debates probably the focus of too much of the blame.  In a recent meeting the Cameron message seemed to be that the strategy was the right one but that the target audiences were proving harder to persuade than expected.

When a party fails to get elected it does call for a degree of introspection.  However, it should avoid wallowing in it.  The role of timing and circumstance can end up being ignored with a party's analysis of the problems and answers not necessarily wrong but that the electorate is unreceptive, disbelieving of the likely consequences of the mistakes or unwilling to change what appears to be ticking over ok.  It is simply hard to remove a government from power when it appears capable, competent and the economy is doing reasonable well.  This is what the Tories faced in 2001 and 2005.  This can lead to more than is necessary being ditched in the search of electability with a pretty hollow shell being offered to the voters.

Furthermore, the need for a makeover for the Tory party on the scale of New Labour was dubious.  The impact of Thatcherism was a genuine shift in British political attitudes, New Labour was much more the compliance with that rather than another shift.  Graham Sharp of Critical Reaction is scathing of his assessment of the campaign.  The Cameron brand was placed before the party brand but if didn't attract people:

"To win big, all Cameron needed to do was connect with the British public. In this task, he failed alarmingly. This was not just about the detail of policy but about the attitude he presented. The public could not be convinced that here was a statesman rather than a salesman. If Cameron opposed Gordon Brown’s profligacy, why had he gone along with it for so long? If he was a man of his word, why had he reneged on promising a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty?"

This was predictable as pre-election polls showed a deteriorating problem with Cameron's personal brand after the Lisbon treaty decision - not because of the policy decision but because it stopped him looking like something different from the political crowd.  Sharp also sees the apologetic nature of the campaign as a core weakness:

"The Cameron strategy was self-denying. The tactics were a greater embarrassment. And embarrassment is the right word, for the message conveyed was that though the Tories were the only party capable of ousting a tired and discredited Labour government, the Conservative leadership was nevertheless embarrassed to be Conservative. The ‘I’ve never voted Tory before but …’ advertising slogan effectively conceded that being Tory was not normal behaviour, but it was perhaps acceptable in an emergency."

He highlights the difference in approach of New Labour did in 1997:

"It will be recalled that the Labour Party had an image problem in the early 1990s. It urgently needed to show the public that it was not just about striking miners and Greenham Common women but was a broad, national force that embraced ‘Middle England.’ So it fought the 1997 general election not upon slogans of self-pity or self-effacing apology but with palpable belief and self-confidence. In its advertising campaign, it adopted the British bulldog and inter-mingled the words ‘new Labour’ with the red, white and blue of the Union Jack. The difference between the campaign masterminded in 1997 by Labour’s Peter Mandelson and in 2010 by the Conservatives’ Steve Hilton could not be greater. The results speak for themselves."

Cameron backs off 1922 Committee changes

As the arguments about the 1922 Committee dragged on into a second week and continued to lead to much harumphing in the Tory press, David Cameron has backed down over voting changes. This seems sensible as the safety valve of the 1922 committee was more sensible than an increase to increase central control. Such a role is the job of the whips office. Fraser Nelson argues that this is a sign of his Cameron's adaptability and much 'explanation' that what happened was not what was intended. Personally think it is an example of how Cameron's often goes for a bold and grand gesture but lacks a command of the detail, poor at the follow-up and wavers when faced with blowback.

What's the problem with 50%+1?

When I was reading through the LibCon, ConLib or ConDem (copyright Daily Mirror) coalition agreement, I did consider the proposal for the new 55% confidence meaure plain unwise. The idea of fixed term parliaments is a reasonable one but the addition of this proposal seemed to be the creation of an unnecessary problem. So it appears to have transpired with Tory disquiet at the proposal being expressed. The new coalition certainly didn't need a row as its third day story but the inclusion of this idea has provided it.

The core problem with the proposal is it could create the circumstances of absolute paralysis. The proposal is not helped by the fact that where the figure 55% appears to have come from. The answer seems to be found in the mathematics of the present parliament. If the coalition fell a Tory minority government could continue under this rule. However, it is not a good idea to shape constitutional practice on the basis of a single and rare election result.

Avoidance seems to have been the immediate position the Tory leadership have adopted. David Cameron has simply talked about the idea of a fixed term parliament. The Leader of the House of Commons, Sir George Young defence of the policy simply ignores the concerns about 55%.

Granted arguments about the constitution do tend to raise the general public to even greater levels of disinterest but 50%+1 is a simple concept which will have much natural sympathy. Cameron did once claim to be the heir to Blair, if he continues with this part of his proposals he'll have inherited Blair's trait towards constitutional vandalism.

Tories eye deal with DUP

The Financial Times (registration required) is reporting that a deal with the Liberal Democrats is the Conservative Party's second preference. They would rather pusue a deal with the DUP, SNP and Plaid Cmyru. On the central issue of public spending:

"...any support would be to protect their parts of the UK from the worse effects of any spending cuts - a tough demand on a government looking to reduce the £163bn deficit. But Mr Cameron's team believe it may be preferable to doing a deal with Nick Clegg's Lib Dems, who say that electoral reform would be the price of any post-election pact."

This implicitly undermines the Ulster Unionist and Conservative relationship even further. It also leaves a key local negative message against the DUP. It is hard to scaremonger about a hung parliament never mind the SNP if CCHQ seems to prefer such an outcome. The article also highlights that:

"The Tories also work closely with the SNP in the Scottish Parliament".

It predicts that:

"...the Democratic Unionists, the largest party in Northern Ireland with nine MPs, could use its muscle during debate over the Budget to extract concessions."

What he meant to say...

In Alan Clarke's diaries he talks about how on Question Time he dropped a clanger on the issue of defence. He described how Sir Bernard Ingram dealt with the resulting media controversy, he issued what Clarke described as a "what he meant to say" statement.

This morning Ulster Unionists and Conservatives appear to have adopted this approach to deal with the fall-out from Cameron's News Night interview. There is an opinion piece in today's Belfast Telegraph by Cameron and two more in the News Letter (by William Hague and David Shiels). The Ulster Unionist are touring the news studios this morning to reinforce this. There are no special plans for extra cuts in Northern Ireland, the expansion of the private sector is a 20-25 year goal etc. However they are having difficulty in dealing with what "unsustainable" means and the manifesto commitment to a £6 billion cut in expenditure this year.

Cameron pulls out?

It is being reported on Slugger that Cameron will not be coming for the UCUNF regional manifesto launch instead sending William Hague.

If this is true why? Is Cameron wishing to avoid the local backlash from last night's Newsnight interview? Or is it a tacit admittance that he has given up on UCUNF delivering anything?

Cameron trips on Paxman

Comments from David Cameron on last night's Newsnight with Jeremy Paxman seem to have caused something of an Ulster (and North-Eastern England) stir.

The Guardian has gone with "David Cameron targets north east and Northern Ireland for spending cuts". The SDLP's McDevitt has pounced on the cuts message while even 3000 versts is emphasising the need for clarification. Iain Dale is denying there is a problem and alledging leftist bias.

This highlights a key weakness in the UCUNF economic message because while one feature of Tory plans are clear - cuts - its policy on the corporation tax aren't. As David Gordon points out in his review of the corporation tax issue all that is offered in the Tory manifesto is:

"...David Cameron's Conservatives committed themselves to a review."

So the first queston mark is will it happen at all? At the moment this isn't a bird in the hand for two in the bush offer rather a bird in the hand for the possibilty, that at some stage. maybe, subject to EU approval, that there could be two in the bush.

It also shows the weakness of the UCUNF relationship. It claims to have been working on the idea for a couple of years so why is it still effectively on the drawing board and not a clear commitment?

This review will apparently look at the option of devolving the corporation tax to Northern Ireland. However, if devolved, to meet present EU law any cut would have to be matched by a reduction in the block grant. Aside from reinforcing the Tory cut narrative, if the block grant is being reduced year on year how feasible is it for Stormont to find the tens if not hundreds of millions to pay for using such powers?

The recent report by the Economic Reform Group argued that:

"In any event, the difficulties in making a one-off reduction in the baseline should not be overstated."

They highlighted past under-spends as a solution. However they did concede that under devolution the level of under-spends has dropped significantly but they did not include the future environment of public spending levels, how possible is it in an environment of other cuts?

So the second question mark is would it be financial possible for a constrained Stormont to act on its devolved powers?

What if Cameron fails?

Iain Martin believes there will be a civil war within the Tories if Cameron fails to win them victory in the election. He argues there has been a trade off for the message discipline and silence of the various factions of the Conservative Party was based on the expected reward of power. Without the reward he believes it wil be a free for all.

However, the North Channel will not be any protection from the ramifications. Where will defeat leave the UCUNF partnership? As regards factions within the UUP perhaps today's challenge for the chairmanship gives an insight into internal divisions. A grassroots revolt occurred after the Hatfield talks were revealed and the outworking of that was Tim Lemon challenged incumbent David Campbell but was defeated by 183 votes to 130 votes.

Is this result an indication of pro or anti Unionist Unity sentiment? Or is it simply grassroots versus the establishment? UPDATE Mallie thinks its is an indicator of unionist unity sentiments. He argues Campbell is pro-Unity. Campbell has been the front-man but there is the question of his relationship with Trimble.

A Drunken Las Vegas Wedding

David Cameron had much to ponder last week-end and then he got a phone call from George W Bush urging him to intervene with the Ulster Unionists. The arguments about Ulster regaining policing and justice powers would have only added to his problems.

He was chosen as leader of the Conservative party to deliver a return to power. Electorally Cameron had to deliver two targets to gain a parliamentary majority – a swing of 9% on the 2005 result with the Tories gaining at least 40% of the national vote.

Neither was necessarily an easy task but the political backdrop should have made the electoral work simpler. The Labour party has been in government for nearly 13 years. It is lead by a Prime Minister whose personal ratings are so bad even his own family must be giving negative answers to pollsters. Our economy is coming out of its worst recession in decades. Despite this, poll after poll has been telling Cameron he is not hitting his electoral targets and that a hung parliament is likely. Less and less people are convinced by Cameron.

Why is this? The recession has probably made people more cautious of change and the fact that so far the consequences have not been as severe as first predicted has made some take a second look at Labour. However a significant part of it is Cameron himself. Who is he? What does he think? Where would he take our country? He has singularly failed to provide a coherent and consistent picture of his beliefs or his direction.

He wanted to be the heir to Blair then the British Obama. He was Mr UK until European leaders made threatening noises and he caved on his cast-iron guarantee of a Lisbon Treaty referendum. He was Mr Public Spending then Mr Austerity finally Mr Not-so-Austere with each shift defined by opinion polls. On a Monday he is the defender of marriage and family but on a Tuesday he’s trying to woo the gay rights vote.

He has never made his own public persona but always sought to copy others. His instincts are not to lead or defy the public mood but to follow it. His response to the drop in public support was to hire a second polling company, YouGov. Whether he is or not he has displayed all the characteristics of an empty suit. This lack of definition means that the more real a Cameron government becomes the more reluctant voters become about the idea.

If any of the mainland voters watched events in Northern Ireland this week a negative impression of Cameron was reinforced. A prospective Prime Minister has to project strength and an ability to shape events. Cameron demonstrated neither and was reduced to offering excuses. Excuses that further undermined the ‘partnership’ between the UUP and Tories.

The former UUP Director of Communications Alex Kane revealed how the UUP could not influence something as basic as a newspaper article or speech of Cameron’s. Now the Tories have shown themselves incapable of any influence on the UUP. The UCUNF partnership appears to have all the understanding, commitment and mutual respect of a drunken Las Vegas wedding.

How to develop Unionism’s relationship on the national stage is a key strategic challenge as the British Constitution and Ulster moves forward. The UUP opted for the limiting choice of an alliance with a single national party. Such an alliance only works if that national party gains power and the ability to influence them can be shown. Power is by no means assured and the Conservatives don’t listen to the UUP or vice versa. The DUP decision to maintain good relationships with the range of parties now appears to have been the wiser strategic choice.

If the election result is a hung parliament or small majority then there will be a real opportunity for Unionism to shape national events and protect Ulster’s interests. It is not the time for Tory lobby fodder. Unionism needs to be clear in its mind what it will seek to achieve from such a scenario and reinforces the need for Unionist Unity to secure 12 Westminster seats and not 10.

Appeared in Belfast News Letter 12/03/10